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Recent Cases
CRIMINAL LAW-BORDER SEARCH-CoNsTANT SURVEILLANCE
NOT EssENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR INLAND BORDEa SEARCH IF CM-
CUMSTANCES JUSTIFY THE BELIEF wrTH REASONABLE CERTAINTY
THAT A VEHICLE IS BEING USED FOR THE ILLEGAL ImPORTATION OF
MERCHANDISE.
On August 19, at approximately 1: 00 P.M., an automobile driven
by Looper was stopped and searched as it entered the United States
from Mexico at Lukeville, Arizona. The customs agent found two
small pieces of luggage but no contraband. Looper had a Vir-
ginia driver's license in the name of Lyme and a key to a motel in
Sonora. The car had been rented in Tuscon in the name of Lyme
but by the use of another person's credit card. Looper said he was
a photographer however he had no photographic equipment with
him.
At approximately 6:10 P.M., the customs agent received infor-
mation that the same vehicle had again crossed the border from
Mexico with one occupant and the same two small pieces of lug-
gage. Failing to spot the vehicle on the main road north the agent
realized that it had entered what is in effect a closed loop of high-
way. This closed loop, the entrance to which is approximately one
mile north of the border, passes through an extremely desolate
area. The agent stationed himself at the entrance, and at approxi-
mately 7:00 P.M., the vehicle emerged with two occupants. It was
stopped by the agent. The passenger, Wel, provided identification,
but would not respond to questions about where he had entered
the United States. Upon opening the trunk, two large leather suit-
cases, in addition to the original small pieces of luggage, were found.
There was a strong odor of marijuana. A search of the suitcases
revealed contraband consisting of marijuana concentrate and other
drugs.
A motion to suppress this evidence was granted by the district
court on the apparent grounds that since there was no contraband
in the vehicle when it entered the United States, it could not be
subjected to a "border search", a search based on less than probable
cause. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
held, reversed: a vehicle may properly be subjected to a border
search, regardless of whether or not it has been kept under constant
surveillance, if circumstances justify the belief with reasonable cer-
tainty that the vehicle is presently being used for the illegal im-
portation of merchandise. United States v. Weil, No. 25,594 (9th
Cir. Oct. 8, 1970).
It is the general rule that, whenever practicable, a search or sei-
zure must be preceded by judicial approval in the form of a war-
rant based on probable causes.' In Carrol v. United States,2 the
Supreme Court stated:
[Probable cause existed where] the facts and circumstances within
their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that [the offense was being com-
mitted.]8
This two fold requirement of warrant and probable cause is the
general and greatest burden of justification that the government
must meet in order to conduct a search. Under certain circum-
stances, however, the burden on the government is reduced. The
maximum reduction occurs at the international border and its im-
mediate vicinity, where vehicles and persons may be searched based
on unsupported or mere suspicion. 4
1. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
2. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
3. Id. at 162.
4. See text accompanying note 12 infra. To be distinguished from
border searches are searches under exigent circumstances wherein the re-
quirement for a warrant is eliminated but the requirement for probable
cause remains. E.g., autombile in danger of being moved, Dyke v.
Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); blood sample procurement
where time required for obtaining a warrant would prevent a successful
test for intoxication, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); photo-
graphs seized in apartment for use in identifying fleeing robbers, Gilbert
v. United States, 366 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 922
(1967).
Compare also a search for weapons, appropriate under certain circum-
stances where based on less than probable cause, but limited in scope to a
Recent Cases
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Closely related to this search at the border is the search at some
distance inland and at some reasonable time after contraband may
have been smuggled into the United States. This latter search may
constitutionally be based on less than probable cause if the cir-
cumstances are such as to justify the belief with reasonable cer-
tainty that customs laws are being violated.5 Both types of
search are included in the generic term "border search".
The search for contraband is governed by federal statute which
provides in part:
Any of the officers or persons authorized .. .may stop, search,
and examine . . . any vehicle, beast, or person, on which or whom
he or they shall suspect there is merchandise which is subject to
duty, or shall have been introduced into the United States in any
manner contrary to law .... 7
To insure that the broad powers granted by this statute do not
conflict with the fourth amendment, the statute has been construed
so as to limit its application to border searches.8 As stated in
United States v. Glaziou:9
A custom officer's unique power to conduct a "border search" is
coextensive with the limits of our international border areas, and
a search and seizure within these areas by a customs officer, rea-
sonable enough under these circumstances, could perhaps be chal-
superficial pat-down. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). It is important in
any search situation to distinguish the external circumstances and the de-
gree of intrusion into the privacy of the individual that is contemplated.
Both factors are relevant in determining what standard of belief must be
met before the search can commence. See note 13 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 10 and 12 infra.
6. Id. Throughout this note, a search at or in the immediate vicinity of
the border shall be described as such. A search not at the actual interna-
tional boundary, but related to that boundary in such a way as to be proper
where based on less than probable cause, shall be identified as a "border
search".
7. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1965). The search for illegal aliens is governed
by a separate statute which provides in part that an officer may search any
vehicle for aliens within a reasonable distance of the border. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(a) (3) (1970). Immigration searches may be made within 100 miles
of the border. United States v. Miranda, 426 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1970).
Such searches need not be based on probable cause or even a reasonable
certainty that the alien will be found. Fumagalli v. United States, 429 F.2d
1011 (9th Cir. 1970). However, they are limited to spaces in which an
alien could reasonably be concealed. Valenzuela-Garcia v. United States,
425 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir. 1970).
8. United States v. Weil, No. 25,594 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 1970) at 4.
9. 402 F.2d 8 (2nd Cir. 1968).
lenged as violative of the Fourth Amendment if conducted by
different officials elsewhere. The term "border area" in this con-
text is elastic . ; the precise limits of the border area depend
on the particular factual situation .... For our purposes, it need
only be said that "border area" reasonably includes not only actual
land border checkpoints but also ... a reasonable extended geo-
graphic area in the vicinity of any entry point.'5
Alexander v. United States,". discussed the standard of belief
necessary to conduct a border search.
[I]t is well settled that a search by Customs officials of a vehicle,
at the time and place of entering the jurisdiction of the United
States, need not be based on probable cause; that "unsupported"
or "mere" suspicion alone is sufficient to justify such a search for
purposes of Customs law enforcement ....
Where, however, a search for contraband by Customs officers
is not made at or in the immediate vicinity of the point of interna-
tional border crossing, the legality of the search must be tested
by a determination whether the totality of the surrounding cir-
cumstances, including the time and distance elapsed as well as the
manner and extent of surveillance, are such as to convince the
fact finder with reasonable certainty that any contraband...
was aboard the vehicle at the time of entry into the jurisdiction
of the United States. Any search by Customs officials which meets
this test is properly called a "border search."12
The issue decided by the court of appeals in Weil was whether
it was essential that before officers could conduct a border search
they believe with reasonable certainty that any suspected con-
traband was aboard the vehicle when it crossed the international
boundary.' 3 A factor notably missing from the surrounding cir-
cumstances in Weil, was that of constant surveillance.' 4
The absence of such surveillance, coupled with the fact that at
least a limited search had already been made at the border,"' meant
that any subsequent search might be directed toward the discovery
of contraband placed in the vehicle while it was in the United
States. The district court apparently concluded that such a search
would not qualify as a border search, thus, it could not be conducted
on less than probable cause.' 6 An examination of recent Ninth Cir-
cuit cases explain the district court's conclusion.
10. Id. at 12, 13.
11. 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1966).
12. Id. at 382.
13. No. 25,594 at 4. It should be kept in mind that Weil is concerned
with the requisite degree of belief in order that a vehicle may be searched.
The complexities involved in the search of a person are illustrated in
Milchen, Criminal Law at the International Border, 6 SAN DIEGo L.
REv. 1, 7 (1969).
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In King v. United States,17 customs agents received information
that certain automobiles would be entering the country with con-
traband. One of the vehicles was observed crossing the border. It
was followed about eight miles and stopped. In upholding the sub-
sequent search the court stressed that the vehicle had been kept in
view at all times and that there was no change in its condition from
the time it crossed the border until the stop. The court stated:
Whatever was in the auto when it was stopped was in it when it
crossed the border. We hold that where . . . officers receive in-
formation that a person or vehicle is about to cross the border
with contraband ... and where shortly thereafter a person or
vehicle conforming substantially to the description .. .is seen to
cross the border . . . is followed .. .and kept under surveillance
until stopped and searched and where there is no reason to believe
that there is any change in condition of such person or vehicle
... so that whatever such vehicle contains or such person pos-
sesses at the time the search is made is the same as it was at the
border .. .such search may be held to be a border search.18
In Leeks v. United States, 9 a stop and search approximately
fifteen miles north of the border was upheld as a border search.
Even though there may have been short periods of time when
the vehicle was out of sight of all of the officers (following in
separate cars) there was no break in the surveillance project.
In Alexander v. United States,20 the court stated that a prerequi-
site to a valid border search was a belief with reasonable certainty
by the agent that the contraband "was aboard the vehicle at the
time of entry into the . . . United States."21 To illustrate that the
search in that case met this test for a border search, the court
pointed out that the vehicle had been kept under constant surveil-
lance, except for possibly one or two minutes, from the time of the
observed border crossing.22 In Rodriguiz-Gonzalez v. United
States,23 agents observed a pre-identified vehicle cross the border.
It was followed to San Diego where it was parked until the fol-
lowing day when it was picked up by another driver. The court
17. 348 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1965). There was evidence of consent to the
search. However the court chose to address the search and seizure issue.
18. Id. at 816.
19. 356 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1966).
20. 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1966).
21. Id. at 382.
22. Id.
23. 378 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1967).
determined that probable cause was not an issue to the subsequent
stop because circumstances justified a valid border search.24 Al-
though the search was fifteen hours and twenty miles after the bor-
der crossing, the court stressed that, because of the constant sur-
veillance, there was no "possibility that the marijuana found
... was placed there at any time following entry into the United
States."25
In Lannom v. United States,26 the suspect vehicle was observed
to cross the board, park, and be driven off by a different person.
The subsequent search was upheld. In speaking to the issue of pos-
session, the court quoted a passage from Klepper v. United
States27 which emphasized the actual observance of the contraband
laden vehicle as it crossed the border.28
In Bloomer v. United States,29 the pre-identified vehicle was ob-
served crossing the border. After being parked and picked up by a
new driver it was stopped and searched. In finding a valid border
search, the court stressed that the vehicle was under constant sur-
veillance, that no person entered it while in the United States ex-
cept the defendant, and that he did not have sufficient time to de-
posit the contraband in the place of discovery.80
In Castillo-Garcia v. United States,3' the suspect vehicle was ob-
served crossing the border. After several stops and a change of
drivers, the vehicle was finally stopped seven hours later and at
a distance of 105 miles from the border. Because of the constant
surveillance, the circumstances were found sufficient to a valid
border search. The court stated:
The distance from the border, whether it be 105 miles or 500
miles, is important only as it relates to the surveillance and any
other circumstance which aids the fact finder in determining with
reasonable certainty that any contraband which might be found
in the vehicle... 'was aboard the vehicle at the time of entry
In the instant case there was a change of drivers, but the fact
that the marihuana weighed 165 pounds, coupled with the sur-
veillance, obviated any possibility that it was placed in the car
after the car entered the United States.32
These cases indicate that, prior to Weil, the Ninth Circuit was pos-
24. Id. at 257.
25. Id. at 258.
26. 381 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1967).
27. 331 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1964).
28. 381 F.2d at 862.
29. 409 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1969).
30. Id. at 871.
31. 424 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1970).
32. Id. at 485.
Recent Cases
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
sibly developing the rule that once a vehicle had departed the im-
mediate vicinity of the border, it could not be subjected to a border
search unless it was certain that any suspected contraband was
aboard the vehicle when it entered the country. In contrast to this
apparent rule, the facts in Well, (viz., the initial and fruitless search
at the border, the lack of constant surveillance, and the subse-
quent mysterious appearance of an additional person 3 in the car)
indicated that the stop and search were made in the belief that
contraband was placed aboard the vehicle after it had left the im-
mediate vicinity of the border. The court explained its position:
The language in these [earlier Ninth Circuit] cases must be con-
sidered in the light of the facts to which it relates. In each case,
the government claimed that the facts showed that the contraband
had been in the vehicle when it crossed the border; in each, that
contention was upheld. It does not follow, in spite of rather re-
strictive language in some of the opinions that such a showing is
the sine qua non of a "border search."
It seems obvious to us that the right of customs agents to search
a vehicle without probable cause is not confined to vehicles that
have crossed the border .... We also think that if customs
agents are reasonably certain that parcels have been (a) smug-
gled across the border and (b) placed in a vehicle ... they
may stop and search the vehicle. Similarly, if the agents are
reasonably certain that a person has crossed the border illegally,
and has then entered a vehicle on this side of the border, we
think that they may stop and search the vehicle and person.
They can assume that he may have brought something with him.34
The rule may thus be stated: Customs agents may search a vehi-
cle if circumstances are such as to justify the belief with reasonable
certainty that (1) there is contraband aboard the vehicle and (2)
the contraband is presently being illegally imported. Prior to
Weil, it appeared that constant surveillance was an essential pre-
requisite to the inland customs search. Such surveillance made
it certain that the particular vehicle was in the same condition as
it was when it crossed the border; 35 this in turn assured that the
33. Note that the stop and search in Weil was also justified as an inimi-
gration check. Such a search would have been limited to a check on the na-
tionality of the passenger and an inspection of the trunk and other spaces
suitable for concealing aliens. The suitcases ordinarily could not have been
opened. However the strong smell of marijuana no doubt would have jus-
tified a search based on probable cause. See note 7 supra.
34. No. 25,594 at 4.
35. Where it could have been stopped on mere or unsupported sus-
picion. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
search was directed toward illegal importation, rather than toward
illegal possession,36 of contraband. Weil has made it clear that
the vehicle need not be so directly and positively linked to the
border. The standard of reasonable certainty applies to both ele-
ments of the rule, viz., that there is contraband aboard and that it
is presently being imported.
Louis E. BOYLE
TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-THE PORTION OF THE NET OP-
ERATING Loss DEDUCTION NOT ABSORBED IN THE "ALTERNATIVE"
TAX COMPUTATION MAY BE CARRIED FORWARD TO ANOTHER YEAR,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IT WAS CONSIDERED IN MAKING THE TENTA-
TIvE TAX COMPUTATION UNDER THE "REGULAR" METHOD. Chartier
Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner (1st Cir. 1970).
Chartier Real Estate Company had taxable income of $84,903.21
for its taxable year ended June 30, 1962, consisiting of long-term
capital gains of $83,787.64 and ordinary income of $1,115.57.1 The
company computed its tax for the year under the alternative me-
thod provided by section 1201 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954.2
In later years, the company incurred net operating losses which
resulted in carrybacks to the taxable year which ended in 1962.
Chartier therefore filed claims for refund for that year, requesting
36. A search for possession, as distinguished from illegal importation,
would require probable cause. See text acocmpanying notes 3, 4, and 5
supra.
1. Chartier originally reported $83,964.70 as taxable income, but later
agreed with the Commissioner to an increase in ordinary income of
$938.51. Chartier Real Estate Co. v. Comm'r, 52 T.C. 346, 348 (1969).
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, ch. 1, § 1201(a), 68A Stat. 320, as amended,
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1201 (a), provides:
(a) Corporations.-If for any taxable year the net long-term capital
gain of any corporation exceeds the net short-term capital loss,
then, in lieu of the tax imposed by sections 11, 511, 821 (a) or
(c), and 831(a), there is hereby imposed a tax (if such tax is
less than the tax imposed by such sections) which shall consist of
the sum of-
(1) a partial tax computed on the taxable income reduced by
the amount of such excess, at the rates and in the manner as
if this subsection had not been enacted, and(2) an amount equal to 25 percent of such excess ....
All section references in the text are to the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954.
